The Age Of Court- Made Candidates
When Political Ambition Seeks a Judicial Shortcut
Nigeria’s democratic process is increasingly being tested by a disturbing development: the growing tendency of politicians to treat the courtroom as an extension of the party primary, and judicial intervention as another route to securing political advantage.
The courts are indispensable to the protection of electoral justice. They must intervene when political parties violate their constitutions, disregard statutory requirements, manipulate nomination procedures or deny aspirants their lawful rights. No serious democracy can afford political parties that operate above the law.
But there is a difference between judicial intervention to correct illegality and the use of litigation to reverse political outcomes simply because an aspirant has lost an internal contest. That distinction is becoming increasingly important as political ambition, party instability and the approaching 2027 general election generate fresh legal battles.
The danger is not that politicians approach the courts. The danger is that some appear to have made litigation an alternative political strategy, sometimes with the expectation that a favourable judicial order can achieve what they could not secure through party organisation, negotiation or the ballot.
This is how the phenomenon of court-made candidates has acquired renewed relevance in Nigeria’s political vocabulary.
When the courtroom becomes a political arena
Political parties are associations governed by constitutions, rules and statutory obligations. Their internal processes are not beyond judicial scrutiny. Where a party violates its own rules or the law, an aggrieved aspirant must have access to judicial redress.
However, litigation should not become a convenient instrument for settling every disagreement within a party. A political defeat does not automatically establish a legal wrong. Nor should a disagreement over political leadership be transformed into a judicial emergency merely because one faction believes that litigation offers a better prospect of victory than internal negotiation.
The distinction between a genuine cause of action and a politically motivated suit is therefore fundamental.
A court is not a party congress. It cannot be expected to perform the functions of party organs, determine political loyalties or select candidates according to its assessment of which faction deserves control. Its responsibility is to determine legal rights and obligations on the evidence and the applicable law.
When that boundary becomes blurred, the consequences extend beyond the litigants. Party authority becomes unstable, electoral preparations are disrupted, and the public begins to question whether political outcomes are determined by voters or by successive judicial interventions.
What the Electoral Act actually provides
The Electoral Act 2026 has attempted to address aspects of the problem, but its provisions must be read together rather than selectively.
Section 83(5), subject to the qualification in subsection (3), restricts the jurisdiction of courts over suits or matters pertaining to the internal affairs of political parties. ection 83(6) prescribes consequences where proceedings are brought in violation of that restriction. These include withholding interim or interlocutory injunctions, deferring the court’s ruling until final judgment, accelerated hearing and substantial costs.
The financial consequences are significant. The provision requires costs of not less than ₦10 million against the counsel who filed the action and not less than ₦10 million against the plaintiff or applicant. Where INEC is joined, the costs incurred by the Commission, including solicitors’ fees, are also recoverable.
But this is not the end of the legal position.
Section 88(2) expressly permits an aspirant who complains that the Electoral Act or the guidelines of a political party have not been complied with in the selection or nomination of a candidate to approach the Federal High Court for redress. Section 88(3) provides that where the court finds that a political party failed to comply with the Act in conducting its primaries, its candidate for the affected position shall not be included in the election. Section 88(4) prevents the court from stopping the holding of primaries or general elections pending the determination of the suit.
The distinction is crucial. The law seeks to discourage litigation over internal party administration while preserving judicial intervention where statutory nomination requirements have been breached. It does not confer immunity on political parties or remove an aspirant’s lawful access to justice.
The challenge is to distinguish genuine complaints of statutory non-compliance from attempts to disguise political disappointment as a legal grievance. Courts must protect legitimate rights without allowing litigation to become an alternative method of determining party leadership or securing political advantage.
The Supreme Court and internal party democracy
The Supreme Court’s decision in Independent National Electoral Commission v. Zenith Labour Party, Appeal No. SC/CV/495/2026, delivered on 24 September 2026, is relevant to this debate.
The case concerned the constitutionality of provisions of the Electoral Act 2026 dealing with political party membership registers and nomination procedures. The Supreme Court restored Sections 77(5), 77(6), 77(7) and 84(2), which had earlier been struck down by the Court of Appeal.
The restored provisions establish statutory requirements concerning the submission and use of party membership registers and provide for direct primaries or consensus as the methods of nominating candidates.
The judgment is significant because it affirms the authority of the National Assembly to make laws intended to promote internal democracy in political parties. It also reinforces the principle that parties must comply with valid statutory requirements in organising their membership registers, congresses, conventions and nomination processes.
However, the decision must not be overstated. It was not a blanket declaration that courts have no jurisdiction over party disputes. It did not abolish the express avenue of redress preserved under Section 88. Neither did it validate every action taken by party officials or render all internal party decisions immune from legal challenge.
Its significance lies in the statutory obligations it restored and the constitutional authority under which those obligations were enacted. It should be understood within that scope.
The larger lesson is that internal party democracy is not merely a matter of political convenience. It is subject to the Constitution and valid legislation. Political parties cannot demand freedom from judicial interference while disregarding the legal framework governing their conduct.
The problem of conflicting orders
One of the most damaging features of Nigeria’s political litigation culture is the emergence of conflicting judicial orders, sometimes from courts of coordinate jurisdiction.
The consequences can be serious. One court may issue an order restraining a party official from performing certain functions, while another proceeding appears to recognise or protect the same official’s position. Party factions then seize upon whichever order supports their claims, and the dispute becomes more complicated than the original disagreement.
This development raises questions about forum-shopping, the responsibility of counsel, the discipline of litigants and the capacity of the judicial system to prevent contradictory proceedings.
A party seeking judicial intervention should not be free to search for a favourable court after failing to obtain the desired order elsewhere. Lawyers have a professional obligation to disclose relevant proceedings and existing orders. Litigants must not manipulate judicial processes by presenting fragments of a dispute in different courts in the hope of securing incompatible outcomes.
The judiciary must also confront the institutional weaknesses that make such practices possible. Case assignment, judicial coordination, disclosure of pending proceedings and the enforcement of professional standards all matter.
Where courts of coordinate jurisdiction are confronted with related disputes, judicial restraint and respect for existing orders become particularly important. The objective should be to resolve the controversy, not multiply its dimensions.
The danger of ex-parte injunctions.
Ex-parte injunctions are sometimes necessary. Circumstances may arise in which immediate judicial protection is required to prevent an irreversible injury before the opposing party can be heard.
But the exceptional character of such orders must be respected.
An ex-parte order is not a substitute for a full hearing. It is not an opportunity to confer a permanent political advantage on one faction before the other side has had an opportunity to respond. Its use must be governed by urgency, necessity, candour and strict judicial restraint.
When an ex-parte order alters the leadership structure of a political party or substantially changes the balance of political power, its consequences can be far-reaching. Such orders should therefore be approached with particular caution, especially where the dispute is already before another court or where the requested relief could effectively determine the substantive controversy.
The court must be satisfied that the urgency is real, that all material facts have been disclosed and that the order sought is proportionate to the immediate danger alleged.
The objective of interim judicial protection is to preserve the subject matter of litigation, not to hand one litigant an advantage that may be difficult to reverse.
Political parties must also accept responsibility.
It would be unfair to place the entire burden of this problem on the judiciary. Political parties have contributed substantially to the litigation culture through weak internal democracy, arbitrary decisions, opaque nomination procedures and the failure to enforce their own constitutions consistently.
When party leaderships manipulate congresses, disregard established procedures, impose candidates or deny aspirants fair hearings, they create the conditions for litigation.
A party that conducts its affairs transparently and respects its rules reduces the incentive for endless legal battles. Political leaders who treat party structures as personal property should not be surprised when aggrieved members seek judicial intervention.
The courts cannot be expected to repair every political institution that refuses to organise itself properly. But neither can they turn away genuine complaints simply because the dispute concerns a political party.
The responsibility is therefore shared. Parties must obey their constitutions and the law. Aspirants must distinguish legitimate grievances from the pursuit of political advantage through litigation. Lawyers must uphold professional standards. Judges must exercise jurisdiction carefully and resist attempts to turn the courtroom into a political battlefield.
Judicial accountability and public confidence.
The independence of the judiciary is indispensable to democracy. Judges must be able to decide cases without intimidation, political pressure or public threats. But judicial independence does not mean the absence of accountability.
The National Judicial Council has an important responsibility to investigate credible allegations of judicial misconduct and enforce the standards expected of judicial officers. Where there is evidence of improper conduct, disciplinary procedures must be allowed to operate without political interference or selective application.
At the same time, criticism of a judgment must not automatically be treated as an attack on the judiciary. Judicial decisions are open to legal scrutiny, appellate review and reasoned public debate. The distinction between criticism of a judgment and intimidation of a judge must remain clear.
Public confidence is strengthened when judicial decisions are transparent, reasoned and consistent with established legal principles. It is weakened when proceedings appear to be manipulated, when conflicting orders are allowed to proliferate or when litigants seem able to obtain judicial advantages through procedural manoeuvres.
The judiciary must guard its credibility as carefully as it guards its independence.
The voters must remain central.
Ultimately, the purpose of party primaries and general elections is to give citizens a meaningful opportunity to choose their political representatives.
When political disputes are repeatedly transferred from party structures to the courts, the democratic process risks becoming detached from the people it is supposed to serve.
Judicial intervention may determine whether a nomination complied with the law. It may set aside an unlawful process or exclude a candidate produced through statutory non-compliance. Those are legitimate judicial functions.
But the courts should not become a political recruitment agency. They should not be asked to determine who deserves a party ticket on grounds of political influence, personal loyalty or factional convenience.
A candidate should emerge from a lawful party process. Where that process is defective, the courts should provide the remedy prescribed by law. The remedy must correct the illegality, not create a new political entitlement unrelated to the legal wrong established.
Nigeria’s democracy cannot afford a system in which the courtroom becomes the preferred destination for politicians who have lost confidence in their own party structures.
The law must remain available to correct injustice. But it must not become a weapon for converting political ambition into judicial advantage.
The judiciary must neither abdicate its constitutional responsibility nor assume the political functions of parties and voters. Political parties must practise the internal democracy they publicly profess. Aspirants must learn that losing a contest is not proof of illegality. And lawyers must remember that professional advocacy is not a licence to manipulate the judicial process.
The ballot must remain the instrument of democratic choice. The courts must remain the guardians of legality. Neither institution should be made to perform the work of the other.
That is the boundary Nigeria must defend if its democracy is to retain both legitimacy and public confidence.
