When The Financial Policeman Becomes The Political Umpire

There are moments when an institution reveals more about itself by the way it exercises its lawful powers than by the powers the law gives it. The unfolding drama between the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Osun State Government is one such moment.

The EFCC says it was acting to protect public funds. It obtained a Federal High Court order to freeze three Osun State Government accounts while investigating alleged diversion of public funds and money laundering.

On the face of it, there is nothing objectionable about investigating suspected financial crime. Public money must be protected and those entrusted with it must be accountable.But another question cannot be brushed aside:When did the financial policeman become the political umpire?

The issue is not whether EFCC can investigate the finances of a state government. It can. Nor is it whether the Commission can seek judicial protection for funds it reasonably suspects may be connected with financial crime. The law recognises such powers, subject to due process and judicial oversight.

The difficulty begins when the exercise of that financial power acquires consequences far beyond the investigation itself.

The Osun governorship election is only days away. A state’s principal accounts are frozen. A sitting government suddenly finds its financial operations under extraordinary restriction.

Whatever the intention of the investigators, the action inevitably enters the political arena. That is why the timing matters.

President Bola Tinubu himself said he was embarrassed by the timing of the EFCC action and directed the Commission to return to court to seek to vacate the order.

The President did not say EFCC should not investigate financial crimes. Neither did he pronounce the Osun State Government innocent. His objection was essentially that the timing could create the impression of federal interference in an election.

That distinction matters.For if an anti corruption agency can lawfully exercise its powers but the timing and manner of doing so can materially affect the political environment in which an election is taking place, then the agency must also be accountable for the consequences of its conduct.

This is where the EFCC appears to have crossed an uncomfortable line.The Commission is a financial crime investigator. It is not the Independent National Electoral Commission.

Nigeria already has an electoral framework regulating the financing of elections, including statutory limits on campaign expenditure. A governorship candidate, for instance, is subject to a prescribed spending ceiling under the Electoral Act. INEC has the institutional responsibility for administering elections and enforcing the electoral framework.

Of course, the jurisdictions can intersect. If public money is allegedly being diverted to finance an election, there may well be a financial crime for EFCC to investigate. But investigating the money is one thing. Assuming a role in determining the political consequences of the investigation is another.

The EFCC may follow the money. It cannot, by the mere possession of a financial crime mandate, acquire the authority to become the arbiter of an electoral contest. That is the danger.

The timing has made the distinction even more important. Had the same investigation been undertaken months before an election, the public interpretation might have been different. But to freeze the accounts of a sitting state government immediately before a governorship election is to enter an arena in which perception becomes almost as consequential as intention.

An institution dealing with public power must understand that distinction. The question of whose interest EFCC is serving is therefore legitimate, although it must not become an accusation without evidence.

The proper answer should be simple: the public interest and the law. But public confidence requires more than an institutional declaration. Nigerians must believe that the same standards are applied consistently, irrespective of which political party controls the government under investigation or how close an election happens to be.

This is why EFCC cannot simply say, “We have a mandate,” and consider the matter settled.Having a mandate does not mean having unlimited discretion. It certainly does not confer political authority.

The most troubling aspect of the affair, therefore, is not that EFCC investigated. It is that, in exercising its legitimate financial crime powers, the Commission allowed itself to acquire the appearance of an electoral actor. That is dangerous.

A policeman who begins deciding the political consequences of the contest he is policing has ceased to be a policeman in the public imagination. He has become a participant.

The solution is not for the President to determine which investigation should proceed or stop. Nor should EFCC exercise its powers without regard to wider institutional consequences.

The courts are there to provide the balance.If EFCC has evidence, let it present the evidence. If the accounts should remain frozen, let the court determine that. If the action has consequences for the integrity of an election, let those consequences be placed before the court.

That is how a constitutional democracy should work. The issue is larger than Governor Ademola Adeleke, larger than APC and PDP, and larger than the Osun election itself.

It concerns the limits of state power. EFCC must investigate. INEC must conduct elections. The courts must adjudicate. The Presidency must protect the constitutional order without becoming a substitute for any of these institutions.Nobody should be above investigation. But neither should any institution be above the law that created it.

The fight against corruption will lose public legitimacy if Nigerians begin to believe that anti corruption enforcement can be deployed in ways that alter the political terrain.

The real question behind the Osun controversy is therefore not whether EFCC should fight corruption. It should.The question is whether, in the zeal to pursue financial crime, the Commission has begun to confer upon itself a political authority that the law never gave it.

When the financial policeman starts blowing the whistle on the political contest, Nigerians have every right to ask: who made him the umpire?